A significant aspect of the Trump administration’s tariff strategy, referred to as “Liberation Day” or “reciprocal” duties, highlighted a discrepancy: these tariffs were substantially higher than those imposed by other nations on U.S. exports. President Trump justified this discrepancy by alleging that the real issue was not the tariffs themselves but rather non-tariff barriers (NTBs) like quotas and technical standards that allegedly restricted U.S. goods from entering foreign markets. Conversely, he claimed these barriers allowed other countries to exploit the open U.S. market.
Contrary to Trump’s assertions, analysis suggests that the United States makes extensive use of NTBs. According to the International Trade Barrier Index by the Tholos Foundation, which assesses trade policies across 88 countries, the U.S. ranked as the 24th most protectionist economy. This ranking reflects the number of trade restrictions a nation imposes, with the U.S. exceeding 60% of the restrictions seen in Japan and Canada, ranked as the most open to imports. Additionally, the U.S. was ranked higher than the U.K., EU countries, and Taiwan in terms of protectionism.
Although U.S. tariff rates before the Trump trade war were relatively low, at an average of 2.2% according to the World Trade Organization, the overall restrictive stance of the U.S. economy stems from its use of NTBs. These barriers include various mechanisms such as quotas and technical standards. The Tholos Foundation identified the U.S. as the 15th largest user of NTBs globally, with significant usage among major industrial countries outdone only by France, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and Switzerland. Policy analyst Philip Thompson noted that both the U.S. and the EU are notably active users of NTBs.
A study by the St. Louis Federal Reserve in 2024 found that NTBs were highly prevalent across U.S. imports, covering over two-thirds of imports in diverse sectors. While tariffs remained low in sectors such as chemicals, machinery, meat, and vegetables, NTBs encompassed a vast majority of what was imported. For example, chemical and machinery sectors faced tariffs under 2%, yet NTBs covered over 70% of these industries. These barriers were often employed to protect domestic industries rather than address sanitary or safety concerns.
One prominent means of protectionism in the U.S. is the tariff-rate quota (TRQ), which effectively serves as an NTB by allowing goods to enter duty-free up to a certain threshold before imposing high tariffs. This tool is commonly used in the U.S. agricultural sector, notably in the sugar industry, where TRQs maintain higher domestic prices by restricting cheap imported sugar. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative publishes detailed lists of TRQs, which significantly impact imports from countries like Australia, Canada, Japan, and others.
During Trump’s “reciprocal” tariff campaign, he proposed significant tariffs against countries such as Taiwan, Japan, the EU, Canada, and Mexico, particularly on products like steel and aluminum. Despite his proposals, these nations typically imposed tariffs on the U.S. comparable to those the U.S. applied to them, often with fewer NTBs. The suggestion for improvement was that the U.S. could lower NTBs to benefit consumers and productivity in exchange for reduced barriers from trading partners, a move that would align with strategic trade negotiations.
